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Lige nu venter over 400 danskere på et nyt organ, der kan forbedre og forlænge deres liv. De venter i usikkerhed, og nogle venter forgæves. I Danmark dør der hver anden uge et menneske, der venter på en transplantation, fordi vi ikke har organer nok til at redde alle.00'Organdonation ? og behovet for en ny model' undersøger, hvorfor det danske system til organdonation ikke er godt nok. Herhjemme har vi aktivt tilvalg, mens en række andre lande såsom Wales, Belgien og New Zealand har andre donationsmodeller. De har eksperimenteret med både aktivt fravalg og tvungent valg, og deres resultater viser, at vi godt kan få flere til at donere på en måde, der er etisk forsvarlig.00Bogen diskuterer således også de filosofiske problemstillinger, der knytter sig til organdonation. Om den enkelte kan bestemme over sin egen krop efter døden. Om efterladte familiemedlemmer skal have vetoret mod transplantation. Og om vi som samfund bør prioritere nogle mennesker over andre i køen til et nyt organ ? og dermed, måske, et nyt liv

International audience ; This article explores connections between the concepts of atmosphere, Anthropocene and contemporary urbanity. First, contemporary urbanity is specified as Metapolis composed of different assemblies of density and heterogeneity. Second, the aisthetic atmospheres of the European Metapolis are portrayed as intensified in the historical centres and pluralized throughout the Metapolis. Third, the Metapolis is connected to the concept of the Anthropocene identified as the Great Acceleration. Fourth, the atmospheric and the anthropogenic aspects are assembled under the headings of the weather, atmospheric attentiveness to the Anthropocene and atmospheric aspects of Metapolitan climate politics.

Unequal and declining electoral turnout has spurred numerous initiatives to reverse the trend. Voting advice applications (VAAs) are one prominent attempt. VAAs match the opinions of voters with those of candidates or parties. As the popularity of VAAs increases and research corroborates their effect on turnout and political preferences, it matters at lot who uses VAAs and, thus, experiences these effects. The early VAA literature found that VAA users tend to be young, well-educated, politically interested men. For the first time, this article assesses whether this pattern changes over time. Using German election data, it measures whether age, gender, education, and political interest still explains VAA use. Age remains important, while gender is no longer significant. Those with the highest levels of education remain significantly more likely to use VAAs, but this is no longer true for those with moderate levels of education. Political interest remains an important predictor of VAA usage. Overall, we have thus seen a development in which users become more similar to the population as a whole. A development which corresponds to Rogers' diffusion thesis. This is important in light of the continued interest in unequal political participation as it suggests that VAAs may, in the long term, be able to reach groups in society currently not engaged in the political process.

Allocating health care resources based on personal responsibility is a prominent and controversial idea. This article assesses the plausibility of such measures through the lens of luck egalitarianism, a prominent responsibility-sensitive theory of distributive justice. This article presents a framework of luck egalitarianism in health, which integrates other concerns of justice than health, is pluralist, and is compatible with a wide range of measures for giving lower priority to those deemed responsible. Applying this framework to oral health, the allocation of livers among potential transplant recipients and travel insurance demonstrates that this version of luck egalitarianism is a much more attractive and flexible theory than much of the contemporary discussion allows. This also pertains to its ability to provide plausible answers to two prominent critiques of harshness and intrusiveness. The discussion also shows that the luck egalitarian commitment to eliminating the influence of luck on people's lives is likely to require substantial redistribution.

While markets are widely lauded as efficient and attractive allocation mechanisms, their moral limits remain a source of controversy. The writings of G. A. Cohen provide an important contribution to this debate. Cohen offers two critiques of the market. One is a distributive critique, which maintains that markets fail in eliminating the influence of differential luck on people's lives. The other is a community critique, maintaining that market relations fall short of a community of mutual caring. These critiques differ in important ways from critiques developed by Satz and Sandel, and suggest a need to assess markets beyond desperate exchanges and the adverse effects of incentives. Cohen's work also points to how we can realize distributive justice and community. His solution utilizes the supply and demand mechanism of the market as a signaling device rather than an allocation mechanism. High wages signal the importance of a specific job, but wage differences are subsequently taxed away. This peculiar market arrangement relies on moral rather than economic incentives and only works if it is combined with a communitarian ethos. This ethos solution is evaluated in light of recent criticisms that it would compromise the freedom to pursue personal projects, that incentives may express community, and that the competition it utilizes mitigates against community. In the end, these critiques are not deemed persuasive.

In December 2015, Wales became the first country in the UK to move away from an opt-in system in organ procurement. The new legislation introduces the concept of deemed consent whereby a person who neither opt in nor opt out is deemed to have consented to donation. The data released by the National Health Service (NHS) in July 2017 provide an excellent opportunity to assess this legislation in light of concerns that it would decrease procurement rates for living and deceased donation, as well as sparking an increase in family refusals. None of these concerns have come to pass, with Wales experiencing more registered donors, fewer family refusals and more living donations. However, as the number of actual donors has dropped slightly from a high level, the situation must be monitored closely in the years to come.

Deriving value in Capital Marx uses three commensurability arguments (CA1-3). CA1 establishes equivalence in exchange as exchangeability with the same third commodity. CA2 establishes value as common denominator in commodities: embodied abstract labour. CA3 establishes value substance as commonality of labour: physiological labour. Tensions between these logics have permeated Marxist interpretations of value. Some have supported value as embodied labour (CA2, 3), others a monetary theory of value and value as 'pure' societal abstraction (ultimately CA1). They all are grounded in Marx.

The scarcity of livers available for transplants forces tough choices upon us. Lives for those not receiving a transplant are likely to be short. One large group of potential recipients needs a new liver because of alcohol consumption, while others suffer for reasons unrelated to their own behaviour. Should the former group receive lower priority when scarce livers are allocated? This discussion connects with one of the most pertinent issues in contemporary political philosophy; the role of personal responsibility in distributive justice. One prominent theory of distributive justice, luck egalitarianism, assesses distributions as just if, and only if, people's relative positions reflect their exercises of responsibility. There is a principled luck egalitarian case for giving lower priority to those who are responsible for their need. Compared to the existing literature favouring such differentiation, luck egalitarianism provides a clearer rationale of fairness, acknowledges the need for individual assessments of responsibility, and requires initiatives both inside and outside of the allocation systems aimed at mitigating the influence from social circumstances. Furthermore, the concrete policies that luck egalitarians can recommend are neither too harsh on those who make imprudent choices nor excessively intrusive towards those whose exercises of responsibility are assessed.